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HOW (NOT) TO REGULATE ARTS: LESSONS
FROM OCTOMOM
Radhika Rao
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College
of the Law
PROFESSOR RAO:
So, the title of my talk is How Not to Regulate ARTs, Lessons
from Octomom.
We have already heard of a lot about Nadya Suleman who on
January 26, 2009 gave birth to octuplets by means of IVF.
An article in the Medical Journal of Fertility and Sterility
characterized the birth of these octuplets as a quote, "truly
transformative event, because it has served as a catalyst to
examine a range of clinical and ethical decisions."
Nadya Suleman has been widely demonized as the quote,
"Octomom", a clever juxtaposition of octuplets and mother that
conjures up images of a sinister octopus-like figure with eight
squirming tentacles reminiscent of the evil sea witch in Disney's
The Little Mermaid. You can see that I am watching cartoon and
Disney movies.
I must add that I really do not like this label, Octomom, and so
from now on I am going to refer to her by her real name, as
Nadya Suleman, not as the Octomom.
After this event the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
were besieged by calls from reporters and the general public
raising questions about the lack of regulation in this field.
The outcry of Nadya Suleman's story appears to have altered
the public attitude towards assisted reproductive technologies,
and prompted a legislative backlash where several states
proposed new laws to regulate ARTs in the wake of this event.
Last year both Georgia and Missouri considered, but
ultimately did not enact legislation that would have limited the
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number of embryos that could be implanted in a woman's womb
at any one time. And in fact I think Lee was referring to the
Georgia bill that I mentioned here, Georgia SB 169, The Ethical
Treatment of Human Embryos Act, which was tabled, and
Missouri, House Bill 810, which would have enacted ASRM
embryo transfer guidelines into law, but ultimately did not pass.
While California, the California legislature, considered a law
that would have placed fertility clinics under the jurisdiction of
the medical board. But this law was ultimately vetoed by
Governor Schwarzenegger.
I think that Nadya Suleman's case provides a paradigm, both
for how to regulate and especially for how not to regulate ARTs.
Some critics of Suleman focus upon the medical procedures
that gave rise to the birth of octuplets. Namely the implantation
of what was then thought to be six embryos.
Just that week some of you may have heard that it actually
turned out that Dr. Kamrava, her physician, implanted twelve
embryos, not six, into her womb.
But other critics focus upon Nadya Suleman herself, her
identity as a non-white single woman who was unemployed and
had been supporting herself with Worker's Compensation and
disability payments for several years, and her alleged inability to
parent eight more children when she already had six children
under the age of eight and was living with her parents in a three
bedroom house on the verge of foreclosure. These were a lot of
the facts that are talked about in that case.
I think that Suleman's case exemplifies a line, a line between
status and conduct based regulation of ARTs, because it has
really provoked calls for both kinds of regulation.
Status based regulation would limit ARTs to certain types of
people. For example, married couples rather than single persons
or heterosexuals rather than homosexuals. Status based
regulations might also deny or limit access to ARTs based upon
factors such as race, ethnicity, class or disability.
Conduct based regulation of ARTs on the other hand would
regulate what may be done but not who may do it. For example,
laws that prohibit certain technologies such as reproductive
cloning or laws that limit the total number of embryos that can
be implanted in a woman's womb at any one time would regulate
conduct in order to prevent potential harm either to the woman
or to the children born of such technologies.
But such laws would not limit the types of people who could
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have access to ARTs.
I first proposed this distinction between status and conduct
based regulations of ARTs in an article that I wrote called Equal
Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive
Equality, which was published shortly before Suleman gave birth
to octuplets.
In the article, I advocate a novel approach to constitutional
analysis of assisted reproductive technologies that emphasizes
reproductive equality rather than reproductive liberty. I argue
that there is not really a right, a general right to use assisted
reproductive technology as a matter of reproductive autonomy,
but there may be a limited right, a more limited right to use
ARTs as a matter of reproductive equality.
So the government could theoretically prohibit the use of a
particular technology that it thinks is particularly harmful across
the board for everyone, but once the state permits use in some
context it should not be able to forbid use of the same technology
in other contexts. Hence, all persons must possess an equal right
if-even if no one has an absolute right to use ARTs.
My theory does not bar government from drawing any lines
with respect to ARTs, but it circumscribes the government's
regulatory power when the line between what is permitted and
what is prescribed is unconstitutional. And I argue that lines
that are drawn based upon the status of the people should be
judged unconstitutional, whereas lines drawn to differentiate
between different acts could be deemed constitutional. Hence a
law that permits ARTs to be used by married people but not
single people, or by heterosexuals but not homosexuals, should be
judged unconstitutional. But a law that merely distinguishes
between different acts, such is a law that limits the total number
of embryos that could be implanted at any one time probably
should be judged constitutional.
Applying this theory of equal liberty to Suleman's case, the
question arises why exactly are so many people angry and upset
about the birth of octuplets to Nadya Suleman? Almost everyone
appears to disapprove of this event, but the reasons behind their
disapproval are remarkably varied.
Many critics decry the fact that Nadya Suleman was an
unemployed, non-white, single mother who was receiving
government assistance in the form of disability and other kinds
of payments.
From the equal liberty perspective I would argue these are
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impermissible factors because they would limit access to
technology based solely upon her status, but then status-based
factors, some of Suleman's critics emphasize the sheer size of her
brood. They find it outrageous that Suleman gave birth to
octuplets when she already had six children under the age of
eight, and these critic argue that both eight is enough and
Suleman's desire to reproduce in such large quantities is a cause
for our concern.
But what exactly is so objectionable about having eight or even
fourteen children? U.S. law generally doesn't limit family size for
fertile persons, so can or should we cap family size for the
infertile? And if the problem is not the size of Suleman's brood,
but rather the fact that she had so many children as an
unemployed, non-white, single mother who is receiving disability
payments, then once again where her offense seems to turn upon
her status rather than her conduct.
But perhaps the problem is not that Suleman now has a total
of fourteen children, but rather that she gave birth to eight
children at the same time. Not eight is enough, but rather eight
at one time is too much. This is because the birth of multiples,
especially in such high numbers, poses a great risk of harm both
to the mother and to the children born using such technologies.
And I think that laws that focus upon this type of conduct and
regulated even-handedly and across the board for everyone,
perhaps those should be deemed constitutional.
Still other critics focus on Suleman's conduct, and what it
seems to suggest about her mental capacity. Some of these
critics argue that her extraordinary desire to have so many
children under such extreme circumstances itself provides
evidence that she's unhinged or mentally unfit, and that is-
unstable and that is unfit to be a parent. Once again U.S. law
generally does not condition the ability to have children upon
one's mental capacity.
So I guess the question arises can or should we demand a
psychological exam as a prerequisite for infertile persons to have
access to assisted reproductive technology?
Although these criticisms appear to be couched in the language
of conduct, I hear they inevitably turn on status. And they lead
to dangerous judgments regarding who's fit to be a parent and
who is not.
For example, would we infer mental instability if the same
desire to have a large number of children was manifested of a
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rich and famous actress?
Right. And I think Angelia Jolie, Suleman apparently models
herself on Angelia Jolie and the photos there kind of show you
how similar I guess she's trying to look.
So what if Nadya Suleman were rich and famous, would the
same criticisms of her mental capacity be made? And in light of
the tragic history of forced sterilization in the U.S. remember
Buck v. Bell and Skinner against Oklahoma. I believe that the
power to choose who should reproduce and who should not is too
great a power and the risk to equality is too great to place those
kinds of dangerous judgments in hands of others, whether they
be the government or the medical profession, and in this respect I
agree with scholars who argue that infertile persons should be
granted equal liberty with fertile persons, so that there should be
parallel regulation of coidal and non-coidal reproduction and
some people argue for that.
But then the question arises, what are the alternatives to
direct government regulation of assisted reproduction
technologies? I would argue that deregulation of ART-of ARTs
is a myth because there are-there is no such thing as these lack
of government regulations.
But one alternative to direct government regulation is the
indirect regulation of ARTs that we already have in the form of
tort liabilities and the rules of family law. The tort system
provides one means to regulate the safety of ARTs by imposing
tort liability upon physicians and parents who engage in
negligent conduct that causes harm to offspring. And the family
law system employs the allocation of parental rights and the best
interests of the child standard as another mechanism to police
the use of ARTs.
So I-here I agree with the critics who charge that direct
government regulation of ARTs poses a risk to those who are
concerned about equality. The risk being that the majority may
not be willing to extend equal rights to use this kind of
technology to members of unpopular minority groups.
For example, law in Italy limits the use of ARTs to married
people or stable heterosexual couples who are of the childbearing
age and infertile, denying use of these technologies to single
persons and homosexual couples. But I would argue that there is
an even greater threat to equality that is posed by these
alternate forms of indirect government regulation.
Tort liability for one is a random and haphazard process that
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overcompensates some, under compensates others, and costs a
huge amount to administer, so that it is incredibly inefficient.
But some scholars suggest that tort liability may be preferable to
direct government regulation of ARTs because it avoids or at
least appears to avoid the problem of government designating
which controversial uses of ARTs are undesirable and cause
harm to women or children.
For example, if we impose tort liability among parents who
genetically select traits in their offspring that might appear
preferable to government regulation, because it appears to avoid
the vexing problem of eugenics by not requiring the government
to determine which genetic traits are undesirable.
So a principle virtue of tort liability is that it really does not
seem to be a form of government regulation at all. But tort
liability does not really imply a lack of government regulations,
the government hasn't withdrawn from the field, the
government's still regulating by permitting the imposition of tort
liability. For the government could always announce a law that
expressly prevents tort liability as California did in the wake of a
controversial decision, the Perlinger Decision, which seems to
suggest that parents could be held liable for selecting genetic
traits in their offspring. In the wake of that decision California
enacted a law to make it clear that they could not be held liable.
And government's failure to prevent the imposition of tort
liability is also a form of government regulation.
More fundamentally, the tort system masks or appears to
avoid the problem of direct government regulation of ARTs, only
at the cost of delegating the incredibly important and dangerous
power to make decisions regarding parent's freedom to use ARTs
to reproduce. It delegates this power to judges or juries in
individual cases.
By permitting tort liability the government is not withdrawing
it is giving judges or juries, uneducated members of the general
population, the discretion to decide which parental decisions
inflict harm and which do not. And this greatly increases the
risk of discriminatory decision-making where juries are likely to
impose their own conscious or unconscious biases through this
objective, invaluable vehicle of the reasonable person standard.
And moreover, the lack of transparency would make these
kinds of discretionary decisions incredibly difficult to challenge,
effectively insulating them from any oversight.
So, I think tort liability is very problematic.
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And this has been one of the options or one of the suggestions
in the Octomom-sorry, in Nadya Suleman's case. One of the
suggestions has been to hold Suleman's physician liable in tort
for quote, "gross negligence." And he's currently, in fact, they're
currently holding a hearing to try to determine whether Dr.
Kamrava should lose his medical license because the California
Medical Board filed a complaint against him alleging gross
negligence. And the complaint alleges that he is guilty of gross
negligence both for what he did, namely implant too many
embryos at the same time, but the complaint also argues or
alleges that he's guilty of gross negligence because his-he failed
to refer Nadya Suleman for a medical exam. So tort liability
poses problems.
Another alternative and the same problems would be raised
with family law, but I do not have time to talk about that, I want
to talk about another form of regulation, namely private self-
regulation.
Another alternative is this self-regulation by the medical
profession. But the evidence suggests that self-regulation by the
medical profession will not work because financial and other
incentives bribe doctors to flout or ignore professional guidelines.
Yet the medical profession lacks the power and the will to
effectively enforce these guidelines.
For example, the ASRM had already established guidelines
regarding the maximum number of embryos to be implanted in
women at various age ranges, yet Suleman's doctor repeatedly
and flagrantly violated these guidelines. Dr. Michael Kamrava
claims that he departed from the guidelines and he implanted
the unprecedented huge number of twelve embryos because
Nadya Suleman requested him to do so, even though he knew
that this would endanger both her health and that of her
potential offspring.
Concerned about backlash after the birth of Suleman's
octuplets, it appears that the medical profession is now belatedly
attempting to enforce its guidelines against her physician and
he-ASRM revoked his accreditation and he is now being
accused, as I said of gross negligence by the California Medical
Board and is currently undergoing a hearing to determine
whether he should lose his license.
But the studies show that the conduct of Suleman's physician
in implanting many more embryos than was recommended under
the guidelines is not an isolated departure from the guidelines,
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but a relatively common occurrence.
A 2009 article published in Fertility and Sterility surveyed
embryo transfer practices in the U.S. and found that 94 percent
of the clinics surveyed reported routinely following ASRM
embryo transfer guidelines, but 55 percent of these same clinics
admitted that they would deviate from the guidelines based upon
the patient's request. So if a patient asks for it, they will depart
from the guidelines. Another 55 percent said they would deviate
from the guidelines for cycles involving the transfer of frozen
embryos. And 75 percent said they would deviate for patients
with previously failed IVF cycles.
So the evidence suggests that self-regulation will not work
because physicians fail to follow their own guidelines. The
financial incentives to deviate from the guidelines are enormous
as clinics implant more embryos in order to inflate their success
rates and to attract patients.
Another article in Fertility and Sterility suggests that these
incentives might be reduced by tweaking the definition of
reproductive success. And so let us see here, I have got that, yes,
tweaking the definition of reproductive success.
For example, are we defining the birth of triplets or higher
order multiples as a failure rather than a success?
Perhaps the incentives might also be altered by requiring a
higher standard of informed consent. The doctors rarely tell
patients about the dangers of multiple gestations. But Dr.
Kamrava said he did that with Nadya Suleman and she still
begged for more embryos and said what should he have done
when the patient requested it.
So but there is an even more fundamental problem and I
should say that the ASRM has revised its guidelines to change
them a little bit in 2009 and it also enforced them against
Suleman (sic) by expelling him from the ASRM.
But the more fundamental problem with self-regulation by the
medical profession is that it poses a greater threat to equality
even than government regulation, because the providers are
likely to regulate all the wrong ways. Some providers may decide
that the lesson to be learned from the outcry over Suleman's case
is not to allow ARTs to be used by the wrong people: single
people, gays and lesbians, poor persons and those with
disabilities.
Surveys suggest that providers may deny access to ARTs on a
variety of problematic grounds that old term status of the
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participants rather than the harms posed by their actions.
And so you can see that in the screening practices of ART
providers, many of them would engage in marital status
discrimination. There is a gender disparity here, or sexual
orientation discrimination, economic discrimination, age
discrimination and race discrimination.
In some states these kinds of discriminatory denials of access
to medical services by physicians may be challenged under state
public accommodations law, and this has been done in California.
But in other states there are none, these denials are completely
immune from any oversight.
In conclusion, the birth of octuplets to Suleman was a truly
transformative event. I think it completely changed the
regulatory climate in the field. Prior to that no one seemed
concerned about the lack of regulation, but after the birth of
octuplets there has been a legislative backlash and a regulatory
backlash and belated attempts to enforce professional regulations
against Dr.-Suleman's physician, Dr. Kamrava.
Hence, I think it is no longer a question of whether to regulate
ARTs, the only question really is how to regulate and who should
do the regulating? If you are concerned about the equality as I
am, then ART regulations should focus upon conduct rather than
status, upon what they have done and not who was doing it.
Moreover, I prefer direct and visible regulation to indirect
invisible regulation which tends to be discriminatory and
privileged majoritarian values.
And finally, clearly articulated regulations that are enacted by
publicly accountable bodies are preferable to ad hoc discretionary
decisions rendered by the patchwork of individual decision
makers, whether they be physicians, fertility clinics or even
judges and juries ruling in different cases.
Thanks.
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